Four faces of marginalization: Variations in institutional frameworks of welfare state provisions and social trust in Europe by Tamilina, Larysa & Tamilina, Natalya
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Four faces of marginalization: Variations
in institutional frameworks of welfare
state provisions and social trust in
Europe
Larysa Tamilina and Natalya Tamilina
Independent Research
1 January 2018
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/93560/
MPRA Paper No. 93560, posted 1 May 2019 16:52 UTC
Four faces of marginalization: Variations in institutional frameworks of welfare state 
provisions and social trust in Europe 
 
Abstract 
By assuming that marginalization threatens social trust formation, this study introduces a new 
analytical framework to explain the relationship between a welfare state’s institutional design 
and trust levels in European societies. A good’s life cycle view consisting of production and 
consumption is applied to the provision of social benefits to discern four forms of 
marginalization in an individual’s experience with the welfare state: (a) marginalization through 
attitude, (b) marginalization through context, (c) marginalization through poverty, and (d) 
marginalization through opportunity lack. We argue that universalism in benefit provisions 
minimizes each of the four marginalization forms whereas selectivity is characterized by higher 
odds of marginalization. We further demonstrate that this especially holds true when universal 
social programs are generous and the state dedicates substantial resources to their funding. When 
the state’s resources are scarce, selectivity becomes a good alternative to universalism and may 
enhance social trust formation among individuals. We tested our hypotheses using data from the 
European Social Survey (2010). 
 
Keywords: welfare state, social trust, institutional design, universal social benefits, selective 
social benefits. 
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Four faces of marginalization: Variations in institutional frameworks of welfare state 
provisions and social trust in Europe 
 
People living in universal welfare states have substantially higher trust levels than people in 
selective welfare states (Larsen, 2007; Kumlin and Rothstein, 2007; Rothstein, 2001ab; 
Rothstein and Stolle, 2003; Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005). Controlling for conventional country-
level or individual-level determinants of trust does not fully eliminate this difference. This 
creates space for asking whether the institutional design of benefit provisions can be held 
responsible for variations in trust scores across societies (Kumlin and Rothstein, 2007; Rothstein 
and Uslaner, 2005). 
It is well-established that formal institutional frameworks are essential for trust formation 
processes (Farrell, 2005; Herreros and Criado, 2008; Tillmar and Lindkvist, 2007; Rothstein, 
2003). By defining the welfare state’s institutional design as the structure of the direct encounter 
between citizens and welfare state institutions (Kumlin, 2004: 51), literature suggests that it 
influences social trust in a twofold manner. On the one hand, the analysis focuses on an 
individual’s emotional experience with welfare state institutions and their officials. On the other 
hand, studies draw on the concept of inequality and how it potentially impacts trust levels among 
individuals. Despite strong empirical evidence supporting both perspectives, these streams have 
never been addressed jointly or juxtaposed in terms of their relative importance in trust 
emergence.  
This study offers a single analytical framework to explain how the selectivity or 
universalism of welfare state programs influences trust formation. By assuming that any form of 
marginalization is a primary threat to trust emergence, we distinguish between four mechanisms 
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through which marginalization may arise as a result of contact with the welfare state: (1) 
attitude-related marginalization, (2) context-related marginalization, (3) poverty-related 
marginalization, and (4) opportunity lack–related marginalization. We further demonstrate that 
welfare states with distinct institutional designs have different levels of marginalization, resulting 
in widely varying trust levels among individuals. The European Social Survey data was used to 
test the validity of our analytical framework.  
 
Literature overview  
In his study from 1998, Rothstein distinguished between universal and selective welfare states. 
He argues that universalism in welfare state provisions is more effective than selectivity in terms 
of the substantive justice, procedural justice, and distribution burden. Further research linked the 
universal versus selective welfare state taxonomy to social trust by offering two key explanations 
for how the welfare state’s institutional design can impact trust levels in society: (1) an 
institutional approach and (2) an inequality approach.  
The institutional approach assumes that social trust is a function of one’s perception of 
impartiality and fairness regarding the functioning of public institutions, formed from one’s 
experience with these institutions or their officials (Rothstein and Stolle, 2001, 2002, 2003). A 
positive experience leads individuals to perceive public institutions as fair and unbiased, which 
may spur feelings of safety and trust that can later be extrapolated to interactions with others 
(Rothstein and Stolle, 2008). Also, public officials are viewed as exemplars of society’s moral 
code (Kumlin, 2004; Kumlin and Rothstein, 2007; Rothstein and Stolle, 2001; Rothstein and 
Stolle, 2008), whereas a contact with them provides exposure to general social norms. The 
institutional argument further asserts that bureaucrats in selective welfare states have more 
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discretionary power and are more likely to create suspicions or engage in actual cheating and 
arbitrary treatment, compared to bureaucrats in universal welfare states, which reduces social 
trust among individuals (Kumlin and Rothstein, 2007; Rothstein and Stolle, 2007).  
The institutional argument also expands the notion of fairness and impartiality by 
discussing how individuals are stigmatized when they apply for social benefits (Larsen, 2007; 
Lee, 2012; Rothstein and Stolle, 2001). Selectivity or means-tested programs require a 
qualification procedure and hence pit population groups against each other (Rothstein and Stolle, 
2001). By dividing the population into a majority and “the bottom” (Larsen, 2007), the welfare 
state cultivates a dualism between “the good independent citizens” and “bad welfare dependents” 
(Lee, 2012), which increases distance between individuals in society (Jensen and Svendsen, 
2011; Larsen, 2007). Singling out citizens as special problems violates the principle of fairness 
and divides the population economically and culturally, fomenting distrust not only among the 
applicants but the entire society (Rothstein and Stolle, 2001). By contrast, universal welfare 
states or welfare programs guarantee their recipients general inclusiveness, preventing 
discrimination and promoting norms of impartiality, fairness, and respect, which generates high 
trust levels in society (Rothstein and Stolle, 2001).  
The inequality approach draws on the premise that trust is unlikely to appear between 
unequal individuals. Unequal individuals do not feel the common bonds that are necessary to 
develop trust (Kawachi et al., 1997; Uslaner, 2000). Studies on trust often limit their inequality 
analysis to income inequality by considering that a key threat to trust emergence (Jordahl, 2007; 
Uslaner, 2000). People with fewer resources tend to feel less optimistic about their future, which 
results in lower trust levels towards others (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2006). There may also be a 
perceived injustice on the part of the poor. “Haves” may be seen as having exploited those who 
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“have not” (Bjørnskov, 2005).  The poor may also be dissatisfied with the existing distribution of 
wealth and seek to deviate from cooperative agreements that perpetuate the existing income 
distribution (Boix and Posner, 2005). The inequality approach further suggests that welfare states 
with different institutional designs support different levels of income inequality, resulting in 
contrasting levels of social trust among citizens. Universal programs are deemed more effective 
at generating trust, because they are based on proportional or progressive taxes and nominal 
service/benefits, ensuring better redistribution from the rich to the poor (Bergh, 2011). By 
contrast, selective welfare states often link the benefit amount to previously made payments, 
perpetuating existing inequalities and reducing solidarity between various population groups 
(Arts and Gelissen, 2002; Jensen and Svendsen, 2011).  
Finally, the inequality approach considers the inequality of opportunities by looking at 
people’s access to education, labor markets, gender equality, etc (Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Knack, 
2002; Uslaner, 2000). The degree of equal opportunities among individuals is believed to shape 
an individual’s sense of optimism about the future and thereby influence their sense of social 
cohesion (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2006). Again, universal welfare states are viewed as more 
effective in enhancing trust levels, since benefits are provided to everyone, which equalizes the 
status and responsibilities of citizenship, unlike benefit distribution in selective welfare states 
(Rothstein and Uslaner, 2006). 
Research has addressed the impact of welfare states’ institutional design on social trust, 
but certain drawbacks require further analysis. First, most of the empirical studies are limited to 
establishing a negative relationship between an individual’s trust level and contacts with means-
tested social programs without modeling the logic of causal mechanisms promoted by their line 
of reasoning. This drawback can primarily be attributed to the lack of an adequate 
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operationalization in assessing the extent of universalism and selectivity in welfare state 
provisions. Second, no one has juxtaposed the existing explanations’ relative importance in trust 
formation processes. Rather, the existing arguments are viewed as independent, thereby 
preventing a simultaneous analysis of multiple channels through which the welfare state can 
impact trust levels in society. Third, the division of welfare states into a universal versus a 
selective group is closely associated with the level of social support available to citizens. 
Universalism presupposes that social spending is substantial to ensure that everyone receives the 
same set of social benefits or services (Rothstein, 2001ab).  By contrast, selectivity is associated 
with lower social spending, since social support is limited to the needy. This raises the question 
of whether it is the welfare state’s institutional design or the level of social spending that better 
explains variations in social trust across societies. Sufficient empirical evidence supports the 
existence of a positive relationship between a welfare state’s social spending and social trust 
levels (Rothstein, 2005; Van Oorschot and Arts, 2005).  
We seek to eliminate these drawbacks by integrating the existing theories on the welfare 
state – trust nexus into a single analytical framework. We further test this analytical framework 
with the ESS data by using the ratio of non means-tested to means-tested social spending to 
measure the level of universalism and selectivity in organizing a country’s social benefit 
provisions.  
 
Analytical framework 
For our study, we adopt a psychological approach to explain trust formation. We see “trust” as a 
trustor’s positive expectations concerning a trustee’s course of action (Barber, 1983). As such, 
“trust level” refers to the extent to which a trustor is willing to be open to the trustee and does not 
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fear emotional harm from him or her (Lewis and Weigert, 1985). We further use social 
psychology’s premise that an individual’s marginalization is a major factor in how individuals 
see themselves and others. Marginalization is defined as the process of pushing a particular 
group or groups of people to the edge of society by not allowing them an active voice, identity, 
or place in it (Nelson and Prilleltensky, 2005). Since marginalization relates to negative 
psychological and emotional responses, such as anger, depression, sadness, frustration, 
hopelessness, resentment, isolation, stress, confusion, etc. (Nelson and Prilleltensky, 2005), we 
further assume that marginalization is one of the key factors in turning social trust into distrust or 
in preventing trust formation in the first place.  
To locate all of the possible marginalization instances that can occur through contact with 
the welfare state, we view social benefits as a good and utilize the economics’ simplistic 
understanding of a good’s life cycle as consisting of two stages (1) production and (2) 
consumption. As such, we consider two stages in the individual’s experience with the welfare 
state (1) application/qualification for social benefits or services, and (2) receipt/consumption of 
social benefits (see Figure 1). The application stage is a “production stage” and refers to the 
process of going through procedures that are required to obtain social benefits. Based on direct or 
indirect interactions with welfare state institutions and their personnel, this stage produces an 
experience with the welfare state where the individual forms knowledge regarding the quality of 
welfare state institutions and their officials, which is used to evaluate their performance. The 
second stage refers to receiving and consuming such benefits and involves evaluating how that 
impacts individuals in terms of the relative shift in their current or future well-being. We argue 
that experiences with the welfare state from both of these stages can be linked to marginalization. 
We also argue that welfare states with different institutional designs produce different 
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marginalization levels in any of the stages and may therefore have varying results regarding the 
intensity of trust building processes.  
 
Figure 1 near here 
 
In analyzing sources of marginalization in the application stage, we use the common 
understanding that social benefit provision is embedded within a certain legal framework 
(postulated in formal rules and regulations) and is handled by public bureaucrats. Public 
bureaucrats must interpret the general body of regulations and apply them to each individual 
seeking to qualify for public provisions (Kumlin and Rothstein, 2007). These formal rules and 
regulations are rarely exact enough to provide unambiguous direction regarding the right 
decision in each case (Kumlin and Rothstein, 2007). And even if the formal legal framework is 
sufficiently exact, an official’s belief system, or so called mind-set, may impact how public 
bureaucrats make decisions or predictions and what meanings they drawn from social contexts 
(Quintanilla, 2012). These implicit belief systems shape how officials find facts, the inferences 
they draw, and how they reason and interpret the law (Quintanilla, 2012). The application 
procedure can therefore create two sources of marginalization: (1) marginalization through 
attitude and (2) marginalization through (legal) context.  
Marginalization through attitude occurs when public officials receive or process an 
individual’s application for social benefits. This can manifest itself either through their actual 
behavior towards the applicant or through the ultimate decision that public servants make 
regarding granting or not granting social benefits/services. Both aspects are a function of the 
public officials’ understanding of the formal rules and their perception of the applicant’s 
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eligibility or deservedness of social support. A negative attitude towards immigrants may, for 
instance, lead to the application procedure for an individual with an immigration background to 
be more time-consuming and stressful compared to an individual with similar needs but of the 
same nationality as the public official. Such experiences can shape an applicant’s perception of 
how fair and impartial the entire welfare system is, influencing the applicants’ institutional trust 
and, as a result, trust towards other individuals.  
Marginalization through context refers to formal rules and regulations regarding welfare 
eligibility that public officials must interpret during the benefit production stage. As such, the 
applicant’s perception of fairness and impartiality regarding decisions made by welfare state 
officials is a function of (a) the actual quality of rules and regulations that are to be interpreted 
and (b) the extent to which existing rules and regulations are enforced. Numerous regulations or 
ambiguous stipulations associated with the application procedure or eligibility criteria increase 
chances of arbitrariness and cheating among public bureaucrats in their decision making about 
granting social support to applicants. Low levels of law enforcement and widespread corruption 
in a country’s social benefit provisions may cause more public officials to deviate from existing 
regulations. Widespread corruption in a country may also motivate applicants to manipulate 
eligibility criteria to qualify for social support or contribute to the assumption that corruption 
constitutes the only way of obtaining even justified benefits. Inadequate regulations and high 
levels of corruption both undermine the concept of impartiality and fairness, increasing instances 
of marginalization and reducing trust in both of the two forms: institutional and social.  
The consumption-related phase refers to evaluating current or future changes in the 
individual’s quality of life arising from either receiving or not receiving the requested social 
benefits. Based on this premise, we derive two more sources of marginalization: (1) 
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marginalization through poverty and (2) marginalization through opportunity lack. The 
marginalization through poverty relates to a change in the benefit recipient’s present economic 
well-being where receiving the requested social benefits lifts him or her above the poverty line. 
Poverty reduction nurtures feeling optimistic and secure about the future, which should lead to 
higher trust levels not only towards the welfare state system but also towards other individuals, 
in general (Uslaner,  2000). The marginalization through opportunity lack is derived from the 
equality of opportunity argument and relates to the government providing insufficient access to 
sectors that determine an individual’s opportunity set, thereby constraining this individual’s 
prospects for improving his or her situation in the future. Here, we consider conventional 
opportunities concerning employability, education, and the health system. A wider set of 
available opportunities is expected to lead to higher trust levels.  
We use these four forms of marginalization to compare the impact of universal and 
selective welfare states on social trust. In doing this juxtaposition, we adopt the conventional 
understanding that a universal welfare state offers all or most of the social benefits on a universal 
or non means-tested basis without linking the benefit amount to a person’s need or income level. 
By contrast, the selective welfare state provides all or most of the social benefits on a means-
tested basis, with public officials having essential discretionary power in deciding whether to 
grant an applicant’s requested social benefit. Here, the benefit coverage is limited to those who 
need social support. Drawing from these key differences, we suggest that  
Proposition 1: By minimizing each of the four forms of marginalization, universalism in 
welfare state provisions should lead to higher levels of social trust than selectivity. By 
eliminating the application procedure, universal social programs require less interaction with 
social benefit applicants and hence minimize the odds of marginalization through attitude or 
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behavior compared to selective welfare states. Eliminating application procedures also suggests 
that poorly formulated social regulations or widespread corruption may only marginally impact 
an individual’s experience with universal welfare states. Finally, universalism in social 
provisions guarantees better redistribution from the rich to the poor and minimizes instances of 
poverty-related or opportunity lack related marginalization in society. As such, we expect that  
 
Hypothesis 1: Compared to selectivity, universalism in welfare state provisions leads to 
lower levels of marginalization in each of the four forms, resulting in higher levels of social trust.  
 
Proposition 2: Compared to selectivity, the universal coverage of social benefits leads to 
a greater increase in social trust levels as a response to a reduction in each of the four 
marginalization forms. With universal social programs, most of the population is exposed to the 
impact that a reduction in the four forms of marginalization has on their life, which can directly 
influence their perception of other people and thereby their trust level towards others. In 
selective welfare states, the impact that receiving social benefits has on recipients is limited to 
them and can only indirectly be analyzed with regard to the rest of the population. This suggests 
that the social trust levels of benefit recipients in selective welfare states are subject to direct 
amelioration whereas the rest of the population can reconsider their trust levels only marginally 
through social programs’ indirect economic, social or political consequences. Therefore, we 
anticipate that  
 
Hypothesis 2: An equal reduction in marginalization of any form leads to a greater 
increase in social trust levels in universal welfare states than in selective welfare states.  
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Proposition 3: Both universalism and selectivity yield more social trust in society when 
social spending is higher. Higher social spending may reduce marginalization instances in both 
universal and selective welfare states by offering higher social benefits or more generous social 
coverage to recipients. More generous social programs set fewer constraints on welfare state 
institutions or their officials thereby limiting the attitude- and context-related marginalization 
forms. Generous social program funding (whether universal or selective) also reduces 
marginalization through poverty to a greater extent and enables the provision of a wider set of 
opportunities in key economic sectors, thereby leading to higher trust levels.  
 
Hypothesis 3: The impact of universalism and selectivity on social trust is greater when 
social spending is higher.  
 
Data and methods 
For testing our hypotheses, we use the European Social Survey conducted in 2010. The sample is 
restricted to countries for which the data on the key variables are available and includes Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The total number of cases amounts to 
23,631. The following set of variables is utilized in the analysis (see Table 1 for the descriptive 
statistics).  
 
Table 1 near here 
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Dependent variable 
Social trust is defined on the basis of the following question “generally speaking, would you say 
that most people can be trusted or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?” The 
responses vary from 0 “no trust at all” to 10 “complete trust.” 
Independent variables  
We operationalize the welfare state’s institutional design through non means-tested and means-
tested social spending expressed as a percentage of countries’ GDP. We also calculate the ratio 
of means-tested to non means-tested social spending in order to deviate from the extent of 
welfare state development in a country and focus on the level of universalism or selectivity in the 
overall volume of welfare state provisions. The data are sourced from the European System of 
Integrated Social Protection Statistics (EUROSTAT website).  
The marginalization through attitude mechanism refers to one’s perception of treatment 
by public bureaucrats and the perception of the needy that is prevalent in society. Since the ESS 
does not contain any variables measuring one’s perception of welfare state institutions, we use 
the question asking the respondents to specify the frequency with which the police treat people in 
their country with respect. This question is expected to approximate the level of respect with 
which public institutions treat applicants, in general. The responses vary from 1 “very often” to 4 
“not at all often.” The perception of the needy is operationalized through two questions. The first 
question measures the individual’s attitude towards poverty by asking the respondent whether the 
government should do more to prevent people falling into poverty. The second question captures 
one’s attitude towards income inequality by asking whether the government should take 
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measures to reduce differences in income levels. Both questions have a response scale varying 
between 1 “agree strongly” and 4 “disagree strongly.”  
The marginalization through context mechanism is operationalized through the quality of 
a country’s informal and formal institutional contexts. The informal institutional context is 
measured through the average of two questions regarding how wrong the respondent considers 
(1) making an exaggerated or false insurance claim and (2) buying something one thought might 
be stolen.  Each of the questions has responses with values varying between 1 “seriously wrong” 
and 4 “not wrong at all.” The quality of formal environment is approximated through (1) 
impartiality and fairness and (2) corruption levels in public institutions. The impartiality and 
fairness variable is measured through an average of responses provided to two questions 
regarding how the respondent would say that (a) the police or (b) courts make fair, impartial 
decisions in the cases they deal with. The response scale varies from 1 “very often” to 4 “not at 
all often.” The corruption levels are captured by an average of responses to two questions 
regarding the frequency with which the respondent would say (a) the police and (b) the courts 
take bribes, with responses ranging between 0 “never” and 10 “always.”  
The marginalization through poverty mechanism is operationalized through an 
individual’s experience with poverty, income dispersion around a country’s poverty line, and 
income insufficiency. The individual’s experience with poverty is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of one when the individual’s income is above the national poverty line. A country’s 
poverty line is calculated for each country individually by taking 60 percent of median household 
income provided by the ESS. The dispersion around poverty line is constructed as follows: 
(individual income – a country’s poverty line)/ a country’s poverty line. We then rescale the 
values to change between 0 and 1, with higher values corresponding to greater negative distance 
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to the poverty line. Income insufficiency is operationalized through the question about the 
respondents’ feeling regarding their present income. The initial responses vary from 1 “living 
comfortably on present income” to 4 “finding it very difficult on present income.” 
The marginalization through opportunity lack mechanism is operationalized through 
three questions regarding one’s perception about (1) the present state of economy, (2) education 
and (3) the health system. Each of the questions has responses varying between 0 “extremely 
satisfied” to 10 “extremely dissatisfied.” The quality of three above domains is expected to 
approximate opportunity sets of individuals through the economy, education and health systems.  
We rescale the values of the four mechanisms’ operationalizations to change between 0 
and 1, with higher values corresponding to greater marginalization in each of the four forms.  
Control variables 
We control for the conventional determinants of trust such as frequency of TV watching, interest 
in politics, frequency of meeting friends, health condition, and religiosity levels (Christoforou, 
2004; Hall, 1999; Van Oorschot and Arts, 2005). The frequency of watching tv variable has 
values varying from 1 “no time at all” to 7 “more than three hours a day”. Respondents’ level of 
interest in politics ranges between 1 “very interested” and 4 “not interested at all”. The frequency 
of meeting friends or colleagues is measured through a seven-point scale with values changing 
between 1 “never” to 7 “every day”. The respondents’ health condition is operationalized 
through the question asking respondents to self-rate their health status on a scale between 1 “very 
good” and 5 “very bad”. One’s religiosity is approximated through the frequency with which one 
attends religious services, with responses varying between 1 “every day” to 7 “never”. 
Additionally, we control for the respondents’ immigration status, age, years of completed 
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education and gender (Bjørnskov, 2007; Hall, 1999; Van Oorschot and Arts, 2005). Finally, we 
include the household income variable measured on a ten-point scale.  
Methods Used in the Analysis 
We test our hypotheses by running a multilevel analysis, which allows us to control for 
hierarchical structure of our data. This is necessary to prevent the un-modeled country 
information from ending up all being pooled into the single individual error (Luke, 2004). The 
empirical model takes the following form:  
Social_Trustij = γ00 + γ10Attitude_Marginalizationij + γ20Context_Marginalizationij + 
γ30Poverty_Marginalizationij + γ40Opportunity_Lack_Marginalizationij + γ50Xij + m0j + εij       (1) 
Here, Attitude_Marginalizationij, Context_Marginalizationij, Poverty_Marginalizationij, 
and Opportunity_Lack_Marginalizationij are the four marginalization mechanisms, Xij is a set of 
control variables, m0j is variance at the country level and εij is variance at the individual level. 
We use STATA command GLLAMM for calculating the model parameters.  
 
Empirical results and discussion  
We begin our analysis by calculating a ratio of means-tested to non means-tested spending and 
determining the median for the selected countries. The median (0.070) is used as a benchmark 
for dividing the sample into two sub-samples. The first comprises countries with a ratio of less 
than 0.070 and includes Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, and Sweden. This group is characterized by more 
universal welfare state designs. The second group includes the remaining countries, which have a 
ratio above 0.070 and are hence characterized by a rather selective welfare state system.  
17 
 
We further calculate the marginalization mechanisms’ mean values for the universal and 
selective groups. Juxtaposing these values reveals substantial differences (see Table 2) in 
marginalization levels stemming from both the production and consumption stages of the social 
benefit life cycle. Universalism guarantees a more narrow distribution of income around the 
poverty line and is supported by a greater concern for poverty reduction. Universalism also 
enables more impartiality and fairness in interactions with public institutions and their officials. 
The greatest differences, however, lies in the respondents’ perception of available opportunities 
as measured through their satisfaction with the economy and its key sectors, such as education 
and health care.  
 
Table 2 near here 
 
We use the universalism versus selectivity division to construct a dummy that takes the 
value of one if a country belongs to the group with more universal institutional designs and 
otherwise takes the value of zero. Since the welfare state is a country-level category, we first 
resort to a country-level analysis. We link the universalism dummy to social trust levels for the 
aggregated dataset obtained by calculating countries’ mean values for the selected variables (see 
Table 3). Two interesting nuances emerge from this analysis. First, we establish that 
universalism in social provisions has a strong positive effect on trust scores. This positive effect 
remains robust after controlling for the conventional trust determinants, such as criminality 
levels, being a post-communist country, and altruism levels. Second, universalism’s impact on 
trust changes most dramatically when including the overall level of social spending, measured as 
a percentage of GDP. 
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Table 3 near here 
 
To provide a better insight into the first nuance, we run a simultaneous equation model to 
check whether the impact of universalism versus selectivity goes through the four 
marginalization channels proposed by our analytical framework. More specifically, the system of 
equations includes a cross-country trust equation and a channel equation that models one of the 
four marginalization mechanisms. Due to a limited number of countries in our sample, we 
include the marginalization mechanisms sequentially. The universalism dummy is included in 
both equations. The four marginalization mechanisms appear endogenous in the system. 
Therefore, we consider it necessary to use instrumental variables estimation to ensure that our 
structural parameters are identified. The choice of the instruments is done based on their strong 
correlation with the corresponding variables, while ensuring that they are theoretically or 
statistically unrelated to the main dependent variable (social trust). In addition, we include other 
control variables in the channel equations, with the number of inclusions being sufficient for the 
order condition for identification to be satisfied. We estimate the full set of equations jointly 
using three-stage least square by applying STATA command reg3 to the aggregated data-set. The 
base model is as: 
Trustj = α0 + α1Marginalization_mechanismj + α2Universalism_dummyj+ εj                           (2)                          
Marginalization_mechanismj=β0+ β1Universalism_dummyj + β2Interested_in_politicsj + 
β3Post_Communist_dummyj + β4Instrumentj+ϕj                                                                                                               (3) 
Where, Trust is social trust scores. Marginalization_mechanism is a single measure of 
one of the four marginalization mechanisms which is constructed by applying the STATA 
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predict option for factor analysis. The single measure variables have values rescaled to vary 
between 0 and 1, with higher values corresponding to greater marginalization in each of the four 
forms. Universalism_dummy is a dummy variable that takes the value of one when a country’s 
welfare state can be characterized as having a rather universal institutional design and the value 
of zero when otherwise. Interested_in_politics is a country-level mean value for a question in 
which the respondents should self-rate their interest in politics by using a four-point scale, with 
response values varying from 1 “very interested” to 4 “not interested at all.” 
Post_Communism_dummy is a dummy that takes the value of one when a country has 
experienced a post-communist transition. Instrument stands for the variables used to instrument 
one of the marginalization mechanisms. The marginalization through attitude variable is 
instrumented with the question asking the respondents to specify how important it is that people 
are treated equally and have equal opportunities. The responses vary between 1 “not like me at 
all” to 6 “very much like me.” The marginalization through context mechanism is instrumented 
with the question about the degree to which respondents agree that all laws should be strictly 
obeyed. The response values range between 1 “disagree strongly” to 5 “agree strongly.” The 
marginalization through poverty line is instrumented with a country’s actual poverty line 
calculated as 60 percent of a country’s median household income. The marginalization through 
opportunity lack mechanism is instrument with the question about the respondents’ overall 
satisfaction with life. The responses vary from 0 “extremely dissatisfied” to 10 “extremely 
satisfied.” 
Table 4 provides the results for our simultaneous equation analysis. It reveals that the 
behavioral and contextual marginalization mechanisms are weak channels for the impact that the 
welfare state institutional design has on social trust. This impact is rather direct and cannot be 
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explained by the above two marginalization mechanisms. By contrast, the poverty and 
opportunity lack marginalization mechanisms were found to channel the impact of the 
universalism dummy on social trust. More universalism in welfare state provisions leads to less 
marginalization through poverty and opportunity lack thereby enhancing social trust formation. 
Note that in the case of the consumption-stage marginalization forms, the universalism dummy 
did not register a direct impact on social trust. Given the operationalization strategies for the 
marginalization mechanisms used in this analysis, we conclude that one’s experience with the 
welfare state and its institutional design in the consumption dimension plays a more significant 
role in the individuals’ social trust formation process than the negative perceptions that result 
from one’s experience during the application stage. We hence received only partial support for 
Hypothesis 1. 
Table 4 near here 
 
We now juxtapose the universal versus selective country categories to consider how an 
equal change in each of the marginalization forms impacts social trust in the two subsamples. 
Table 5 shows the results for the key control variables that are used as a base model for our 
analysis. Table 6 contains results for the augmented models in which we sequentially include the 
four marginalization mechanisms’ items. Our individual-level analysis suggests that, in most 
cases, an equal reduction in marginalization levels of any form produces more social trust among 
individuals in universal welfare states than in selective welfare states. This is in line with 
Hypothesis 2. Since universalism in welfare states aims to provide support to everyone, social 
trust levels are more responsive to social programs than in selective welfare states where social 
support is only given to those in need. Again, the greatest differences are found in the 
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consumption dimension that describes changes in one’s current or future well-being. Both 
findings suggest that the inequality argument better explains how a welfare state’s institutional 
design impacts social trust than the behavioral argument.  
 
Table 5 and Table 6 near here 
 
Our results suggest that taking into account the universal versus selective nature of 
welfare states is necessary when analyzing social trust formation. But, there is more to 
understanding the overall relationship between the welfare state and trust levels. The second 
nuance derived from Table 3 indicates that social trust in society is influenced not only by the 
level of universalism in welfare state provisions but also by the extent to which the welfare state 
is developed (viewed as the level of social spending). To account for both the level of 
universalism and the extent of welfare state development, we calculate the median for the overall 
social spending variable and use it along with the universalism versus selectivity ratio’s median 
to divide countries into four groups (see Figure 2). The first comprises Belgium, Finland, 
Norway, and Sweden. These countries have a ratio of means-tested to non means-tested social 
spending below 0.070, whereas the overall social spending is above the sample’s median of 23 
percent. We call this group Generous Universalism. The second group still includes countries 
with a universal institutional design (with a ratio below 0.070) but with lower levels of overall 
social support (social spending below 23 percent of GDP) and is called Meager Universalism. 
This group includes post-communist countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia) that retained the Socialism’s universal approach to social 
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provisions but, due to transition and relative economic weaknesses, are unable to direct 
substantial public resources to social programs. 
Similarly, we define the group of Generous Selectivity as countries having a ratio value 
above 0.070 with social spending above 23 percent of GDP. This group is represented by 
Germany, Denmark, Spain, France, the United Kingdom, Greece, and the Netherlands. Finally, 
the group of Meager Selectivity is comprised of Croatia, Cyprus, Ireland, Slovenia, and 
Switzerland and includes countries with a ratio value above the benchmark and overall social 
spending below 23 percent of GDP. Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of the selected countries 
across the four groups. Table 7 reports mean values for the marginalization mechanisms by 
country group. 
 
Figure 2 and Table 7 near here 
 
We use the above typology to construct dummies for the four country groups. We further 
include these dummies in the trust base model by using Generous Universalism as our reference 
category (see Table 8). Our results indicate that social trust is more easily formed in Generous 
Universalism and most difficult to form in Meager Selectivity or Meager Universalism. 
Additionally, our results indicate that Generous Selectivity is more effective in promoting social 
trust than Meager Universalism, thereby suggesting that when resources are scarce they should 
be directed only to those in need. Still, our results emphasize that social trust is higher in 
Generous Universalism than in Meager Universalism, whereas Generous Selectivity promotes 
trust formation more effectively than Meager Selectivity. This is in line with Hypothesis 3. The 
institutional design of welfare states should be analyzed along with the actual amount of social 
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spending that the welfare state dedicates to funding social benefits through universalism or 
selectivity. Our results remain robust after including additional control variables and only 
slightly change when we control for a country’s experience with post-communist transition (see 
Table 3).  
To further explore the relationship between a welfare state’s institutional design and 
social spending levels, we examine the impact of the marginalization mechanism items on social 
trust in each of the four country groups (see Table 9). Our interaction analysis suggests that there 
are substantial variations in how the four marginalization mechanisms affect trust scores across 
the four country groups. An equal reduction in marginalization levels tends to produce more 
social trust in Generous Universalism than in Meager Universalism. A similar observation was 
found between Generous Selectivity and Meager Selectivity: When selectivity is more generous, 
social trust can be more easily formed by improving marginalization variables. There tends to be 
a smaller but still positive impact with Generous Selectivity compared to Generous 
Universalism.  
 
Table 8 and Table 9 near here 
 
Finally, we illustrate the relative positioning of the four typology groups regarding their 
values on the four marginalization mechanisms (see Figure 3). Generous Universalism ensures 
weak marginalization in each of the four mechanisms and is characterized by the sample’s 
highest trust levels. By contrast, Meager Selectivity produces values suggesting that strong 
marginalization is possible through each of the four mechanisms, resulting in the sample’s lowest 
trust levels. Generous Selectivity focuses on minimizing marginalization through poverty and 
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opportunity lack but still allows some marginalization through behavior and context, with social 
trust exhibiting average values. In contrast, Meager Universalism has slightly worse values on 
the poverty and opportunity marginalization mechanisms; while the values for behavioral and 
context marginalization are better, it still has the sample’s lowest trust levels. This again supports 
our claim that the relationship between the welfare state and social trust is not only influenced  
by the social programs’ institutional design but also by the actual level of social spending 
dedicated by the state to funding social programs.  
 
Figure 3 near here 
 
Conclusion 
The welfare state’s institutional design is an essential element in defining social trust levels not 
only among benefit recipients but among society as a whole. Our analysis suggests that the 
welfare state’s institutional framework is better understood when analyzed in combination with 
the overall level of social spending. When universalism is generous and hence the welfare state 
offers a wide range of social programs that cover the entire society, universalism can promote 
social trust formation. When public resources are scarce but the welfare state provisions are still 
organized on a universal basis, social trust levels may remain low. In this case, selectivity 
becomes a good alternative to universalism, by allowing the welfare state to direct its limited 
resources to those in need. Nonetheless, selectivity in social programs cannot produce as much 
trust in a society, even with the same level of generosity in social programs, as universal welfare 
states.    
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Our results suggest that the outcome dimension is more important than the behavioral 
dimension in one’s experience with the welfare state regarding trust formation. Since reducing 
current levels of poverty and minimizing the odds of experiencing poverty in the future by 
expanding one’s current opportunity set can best be achieved through generous universalism or 
relatively generous selectivity, these modes of welfare state institutional design prove to be the 
most effective in advancing trust in society.  
Further analysis is still needed to validate the analytical model introduced by this study. 
First, it is necessary to test the dynamic nature of the relationship between the institutional design 
and trust levels by using longitudinal data. Second, our empirical results suggest that the impact 
of selectivity and universalism in social provisions may go through channels other than those 
proposed by this study thereby implying that we might not know enough about the overall set of 
mechanisms through which the welfare state impacts social trust. This can in turn be attributed to 
a more general problem concerning the lack of a clear theoretical framework that explains the 
trust building process in relation to social policy.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the key variables used in the analysis.  
VARIABLES N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Social trust 23,631 1.000 10.000 5.189 2.368 
Treatment with respect 23,631 0.000 1.000 0.297 0.172 
Attitude towards income 
inequality 
23,631 
0.000 1.000 0.424 0.210 
Attitude towards poverty 
reduction  
23,631 0.000 1.000 0.342 0.168 
Wrong morals 23,631 0.000 1.000 0.827 0.173 
Impartiality and fairness 23,631 0.000 1.000 0.341 0.149 
Corruption 23,631 0.000 1.000 0.377 0.248 
Experience with poverty 23,631 0.000 1.000 0.213 0.410 
Distribution around poverty line 23,631 0.000 1.000 0.196 0.130 
Income insufficiency  23,631 0.000 1.000 0.515 0.224 
Opportunity lack in the economy 23,631 0.000 1.000 0.569 0.252 
Opportunity lack in the education 
system 
23,631 0.000 1.000 0.441 0.234 
Opportunity lack in the health 
system 
23,631 0.000 1.000 0.465 0.253 
Frequency of TV watching 23,631 0.000 7.000 4.315 2.044 
Interest in politics 23,631 1.000 4.000 2.555 0.895 
Frequency of socialization with 
friends or colleagues 
23,631 1.000 7.000 4.865 1.542 
Subjective health condition  23,631 1.000 5.000 2.189 0.916 
Frequency of attending religious 
services 
23,631 1.000 7.000 5.510 1.461 
Born in the country 23,631 0.000 1.000 0.919 0.272 
Age 23,631 14.000 94.000 47.264 17.502 
Years of education 23,631 0.000 25.000 12.874 3.693 
Gender 23,631 0.000 1.000 0.488 0.499 
Household income 23,631 1.000 10.000 5.381 2.771 
 
Note: The values of the four mechanisms’ items are rescaled to change between 0 and 1. 
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Table 2. The four marginalization forms’ mean values, by institutional design. 
Mechanism items Universal Selective t-test for equality of means 
Mean 
difference  
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Social trust  5.400 5.035 0.365*** (0.000) 
Marginalization through attitude     
Treatment with respect 0.296 0.297 -0.001 (0.490) 
Attitude towards income inequality 0.421 0.425 -0.004 (0.124) 
Attitude towards poverty reduction 0.338 0.346 -0.008*** (0.000) 
Marginalization through context     
Wrong morals 0.828 0.827 0.001 (0.580) 
Impartiality and fairness 0.334 0.345 -0.011*** (0.000) 
Corruption 0.384 0.372 0.012*** (0.000) 
Marginalization through poverty     
Experience with poverty 0.210 0.210 0.000 (0.733) 
Distribution around poverty line 0.189 0.203 -0.014*** (0.000) 
Income insufficiency  0.529 0.506 0.023*** (0.000) 
Marginalization through opportunity lack     
in the economy 0.513 0.610 -0.097*** (0.000) 
in the education system 0.391 0.478 -0.087*** (0.000) 
in the health system 0.451 0.475 -0.024*** (0.000) 
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Table 3. The impact of welfare state’s institutional design on social trust levels, OLS regression. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
     
      
Universalism dummy 0.277 0.693* 0.771** 0.808*** 0.587** 
 (0.374) (0.380) (0.309) (0.279) (0.296) 
Total social spending  0.127*** 0.071* -0.022 -0.026 
  (0.041) (0.036) (0.052) (0.051) 
Perceived criminality   -2.049*** -1.978*** -2.069*** 
levels   (0.606) (0.547) (0.545) 
Post-communism    -1.086** -1.117** 
dummy    (0.470) (0.464) 
Altruism levels     0.770 
     (0.625) 
Constant 4.931*** 1.829* 7.164*** 9.654*** 8.425*** 
 (0.243) (1.055) (1.794) (1.946) (2.162) 
      
Observations 23 23 23 23 23 
R-squared 0.022 0.332 0.583 0.678 0.705 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The perceived criminality variable is operationalized through the question in 
which respondents should specify how safe they feel walking alone in their area after dark. The responses vary 
between 1 “very safe” to 4 “very unsafe.” The post-communism dummy takes the value of one when a country has 
experienced the post-communist transition. Altruism levels are measured through the degree to which respondents 
agree with the statement that it is important to help people and care about others’ well-being. The response values 
vary from 1 “not like me at all” to 6 “very much like me.” 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (2-tailed). 
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Table 4. The four marginalization mechanisms’ impact on social trust, simultaneous equation 
model. 
VARIABLES Marginalization 
Through attitude Through context Through poverty 
Through 
opportunity lack 
Trust equations     
Universalism dummy 0.472** 0.616*** 0.385 0.039 
 (0.222) (0.231) (0.274) (0.237) 
Marginalization forms -3.587*** -4.554*** -3.271*** -3.301*** 
 (0.535) (0.641) (0.647) (0.535) 
Constant  3.552*** 2.100*** 2.648*** 3.214*** 
 (0.266) (0.438) (0.505) (0.335) 
Rsq  0.692 0.678 0.523 0.639 
Observations 23 23 23 23 
     
Marginalization mechanism 
equations  
    
Universalism dummy 0.061 0.035 -0.115** -0.143*** 
 (0.067) (0.051) (0.056) (0.046) 
Interest levels in politics  0.399*** 0.340*** 0.085 0.042 
 (0.123) (0.094) (0.110) (0.105) 
Post-communism dummy 0.229*** 0.048 0.101* 0.054 
 (0.064) (0.062) (0.056) (0.053) 
Instrumental variables     
Important to be treated equally  -0.045***    
 (0.144)    
Laws should be strictly obeyed   -0.452***   
  (0.111)   
Poverty line levels   -0.276***  
   (0.042)  
Overall satisfaction levels    -2.176*** 
    (0.299) 
Constant  -0.641 -0.574* -0.208 0.867*** 
 (0.451) (0.330) (0.334) (0.412) 
Rsq  0.703 0.707 0.761 0.823 
Observations 23 23 23 23 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (2-tailed). 
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Table 5. Social trust base model. 
VARIABLES  
Frequency of TV watching -0.029*** 
 (0.007) 
Interest in politics -0.160*** 
 (0.017) 
Frequency of socialization with friends or colleagues 0.102*** 
 (0.009) 
Subjective health condition  -0.261*** 
 (0.017) 
Frequency of attending religious services -0.043*** 
 (0.011) 
Born in the country 0.237*** 
 (0.053) 
Age 0.009*** 
 (0.001) 
Years of education 0.061*** 
 (0.004) 
Gender -0.027 
 (0.028) 
Household income 0.048*** 
 (0.006) 
Constant 4.255*** 
 (0.228) 
Variance at level 1 4.378 
 (0.040) 
Variance at level 2 0.710 
 (0.211) 
Log likelihood -51036.899 
Number of level 1 units 23,631 
Number of level 2 units 23 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (2-tailed). 
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Table 6. The four marginalization mechanisms’ impact on social trust scores: More universal 
versus more selective welfare states.  
Mechanism items Universal Selective Test for 
differences in 
coefficients  
Marginalization through attitude     
Treatment with respect -1.635*** -1.209*** 22.860*** 
 (0.134) (0.118) (0.000) 
Attitude towards income inequality 0.094 -0.009 3.160* 
 (0.107) (0.091) (0.075) 
Attitude towards poverty reduction 0.497*** 0.434*** 1.230 
 (0.136) (0.115) (0.267) 
Marginalization through context    
Wrong morals -0.494*** -0.054 29.700*** 
 (0.129) (0.121) (0.000) 
Impartiality and fairness -2.679*** -2.220*** 49.030*** 
 (0.154) (0.140) (0.000) 
Corruption -1.296*** -1.219*** 47.570*** 
 (0.108) (0.097) (0.000) 
Marginalization through poverty    
Experience with poverty -0.062 -0.008 0.680 
 (0.072) (0.062) (0.408) 
Distribution around poverty line -1.968*** -0.764* 97.820*** 
 (0.700) (0.408) (0.000) 
Income insufficiency  -0.677*** -0.978*** 22.920*** 
 (0.120) (0.109) (0.000) 
Marginalization through opportunity lack    
in the economy -2.521*** -2.324*** 96.610*** 
 (0.104) (0.094) (0.000) 
in the education system -1.905*** -1.527*** 23.370*** 
 (0.103) (0.090) (0.000) 
in the health system -1.843*** -1.641*** 40.130*** 
 (0.098) (0.085) (0.000) 
Number of level 1 units 23,631 23,631 23,631 
Number of level 2 units 23 23 23 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The test for differences in coefficients was conducted by using STATA 
commands “suest” and “test”. We report the value of ch2 and its p-value (in brackets). 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (2-tailed). 
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Table 7. Four marginalization mechanisms’ mean values, by typology group.  
Mechanism items Generous 
Universalism 
Meager 
Universalism  
Generous 
Selectivity  
Meager 
Selectivity  
Marginalization through attitude     
Treatment with respect 0.250 
(Weak) 
0.348 
(Strong) 
0.271 
(Relatively 
strong) 
0.261 
(Relatively 
strong) 
Attitude towards income 
inequality 
0.404 
(Weak) 
0.401 
(Weak) 
0.454 
(Strong) 
0.426 
(Strong) 
Attitude towards poverty 
reduction 
0.381 
(Strong) 
0.297 
(Weak) 
0.358 
(Strong) 
0.345 
(Strong) 
Marginalization through context     
Wrong morals 0.764 
(Weak) 
0.795 
(Relatively 
weak) 
0.846 
(Strong) 
0.827 
(Relatively 
strong) 
 
Impartiality and fairness 0.280 
(Weak) 
0.304 
(Relatively 
weak) 
0.320 
(Relatively 
strong) 
0.335 
(Strong) 
Corruption 0.241 
(Weak) 
0.513 
(Strong) 
0.328 
(Relatively 
strong) 
0.348 
(Relatively 
strong) 
Marginalization through poverty     
Experience with poverty 0.213 
(Average) 
0.212 
(Average) 
0.214 
(Average) 
0.215 
(Average) 
Distribution around poverty 
line 
0.174 
(Weak) 
0.202 
(Strong) 
0.190 
(Weak) 
0.233 
(Strong) 
Income insufficiency  0.427 
(Weak) 
0.621 
(Strong) 
0.466 
(Relatively 
weak) 
0.484 
(Relatively 
strong) 
Marginalization through opportunity 
lack 
    
in the economy 0.372 
(Weak) 
0.642 
(Strong) 
0.602 
(Average) 
0.600 
(Average) 
in the education system 0.315 
(Weak) 
0.640 
(Strong) 
0.482 
(Relatively 
weak) 
0.609 
(Strong) 
in the health system 0.321 
(Weak) 
0.569 
(Strong) 
0.447 
(Relatively 
weak) 
0.470 
(Relatively 
strong) 
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Table 8. Variations in social trust levels across the four typology groups.  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Frequency of TV watching -0.029*** -0.040** -0.041** -0.038*** 
 (0.007) (0.015) (0.016) (0.011) 
Interest in politics -0.160*** -0.204*** -0.203*** -0.189*** 
 (0.017) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) 
Frequency of socialization with  0.102*** 0.120*** 0.120*** 0.121*** 
friends or colleagues (0.009) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) 
Subjective health condition  -0.260*** -0.221*** -0.219*** -0.201*** 
 (0.017) (0.039) (0.039) (0.037) 
Frequency of attending religious  -0.044*** 0.006 0.004 -0.003 
services (0.011) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) 
Born in the country 0.237*** 0.114 0.113 0.165 
 (0.053) (0.117) (0.117) (0.118) 
Age 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Years of education 0.061*** 0.063*** 0.064*** 0.062*** 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
Gender -0.027 -0.234*** -0.235*** -0.233*** 
 (0.027) (0.059) (0.058) (0.056) 
Household income 0.048*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.054*** 
 (0.006) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
Perceived criminality levels  -0.475*** -0.476*** -0.485*** 
  (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) 
Altruism levels   -0.015 -0.023 
   (0.029) (0.030) 
Post-communism dummy    -0.954*** 
    (0.278) 
Generous Universalism  Reference Reference Reference Reference 
 Category Category Category Category 
Meager Universalism -1.320*** -1.031** -1.033** -0.088 
 (0.398) (0.391) (0.400) (0.486) 
Generous Selectivity -0.953*** -0.763* -0.762* -0.763* 
 (0.360) (0.390) (0.400) (0.400) 
Meager Selectivity -1.402*** -1.102*** -1.106*** -0.682*** 
 (0.428) (0.373) (0.384) (0.226) 
Variance at level 1 4.378 4.008 3.600 3.200 
 (0.040) (0.023) (0.022) (0.019) 
Variance at level 2 0.417 0.300 0.280 0.269 
 (0.100) (0.080) (0.058) (0.026) 
Number of level 1 units 23,631 23,631 23,631 23,631 
Number of level 2 units 23 23 23 23 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (2-tailed).  
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Table 9.  Interactions between the four groups of welfare state’s institutional design and the 
marginalization mechanisms. 
Mechanism items Interaction terms with 
Generous 
Universalism 
Meager 
Universalism 
Generous 
Selectivity 
Meager 
Selectivity 
Marginalization through attitude      
Treatment with respect Ref. category 0.244 0.699*** 0.107 
  (0.278) (0.261) (0.309) 
Attitude towards income 
inequality 
Ref. category 1.023*** 0.466** 0.439* 
  (0.210) (0.185) (0.235) 
Attitude towards poverty 
reduction 
Ref. category 1.635*** 0.669*** 0.656** 
  (0.274) (0.226) (0.290) 
Marginalization through context     
Wrong morals Ref. category -0.212 -0.701*** -0.079 
  (0.265) (0.262) (0.297) 
Impartiality and fairness Ref. category 0.555* 0.522* 0.665** 
  (0.304) (0.304) (0.346) 
Corruption Ref. category 0.404** 0.143 -0.016 
  (0.198) (0.206) (0.242) 
Marginalization through poverty     
Experience with poverty Ref. category 0.022 -0.244*** -0.342*** 
  (0.101) (0.091) (0.113) 
Distribution around poverty line Ref. category -0.608* 0.984*** 0.513 
  (0.365) (0.360) (0.369) 
Income insufficiency  Ref. category 0.711*** -0.399** -0.106 
  (0.215) (0.200) (0.237) 
Marginalization through opportunity lack     
in the economy Ref. category -0.509*** -0.004 -0.285 
  (0.190) (0.198) (0.238) 
in the education system Ref. category 0.114 0.503*** 0.251 
  (0.217) (0.180) (0.238) 
in the health system Ref. category -0.309* 0.020 0.157 
  (0.160) (0.196) (0.225) 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (2-tailed).
 Figure 1. The four marginalization forms framework of analysis.  
Social Trust 
Marginalization by the welfare state through 
The institutional channel The inequality channel 
(2) The benefit consumption stage (1) The benefit production stage 
Application/Qualification for benefits Receipt/Consumption of benefits 
Formal legal context 
regarding welfare state 
provisions 
Public officials handling the 
application and benefit 
provision processes  
Perception of change in 
one’s current well-being  
Perception of possible 
change in one’s future 
well-being 
 
M
ar
g
in
al
iz
at
io
n
 
th
ro
u
g
h
 c
o
n
te
x
t 
M
ar
g
in
al
iz
at
io
n
  
th
ro
u
g
h
 a
tt
it
u
d
e 
 
 
M
ar
g
in
al
iz
at
io
n
  
th
ro
u
g
h
 p
o
v
er
ty
 
 
M
ar
g
in
al
iz
at
io
n
 
th
ro
u
g
h
 o
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
y
 l
ac
k
  
 
40 
 
 
Figure 2. A four-dimensional grouping of countries. 
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Figure 3. The four forms of marginalization juxtaposed. 
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